Flight U2-8213 | Registration: G-EZGY
Date: 19 June 2024 | Location: Ioannis Kapodistrias Airport (LGKR), Corfu, Greece
Flight Details
• Aircraft Type: Airbus A320-214
• Engines: 2 × CFM International CFM56-5B4
• Operator: EasyJet
• Registration: G-EZGY
• Flight Number: U2-8213
• Callsign: EZY8213
• Route: London Gatwick Airport (EGKK), United Kingdom to Corfu Ioannis Kapodistrias Airport (LGKR), Greece
• Date of Incident: 19 June 2024
• Total Occupants: 180 (174 passengers and 6 crew)
• Weather Conditions: Visual Meteorological Conditions reported
Introduction
On 19 June 2024, EasyJet flight U2-8213 experienced a serious incident during landing at Corfu, when a go-around was attempted after the activation of reverse thrust. The Airbus A320-200, registered G-EZGY, was on final approach to runway 34 at Corfu when the approach became unstable in the flare phase. The commander initiated a balked landing (go-around), unaware that the first officer had already deployed the thrust reversers. This resulted in a moment of operational confusion as flight control inputs and thrust settings conflicted. The crew collectively decided to reject the go-around and brought the aircraft to a safe stop on the runway with 340 metres of runway remaining.
The UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB), delegated by the Hellenic authorities, investigated the incident and published its final bulletin on 10 April 2025.
Sequence of Events
The co-pilot was the pilot flying and conducted a stable approach initially, using standard ILS procedures for runway 34. However, on short final, the aircraft drifted slightly high, leading to a longer-than-ideal touchdown—close to the far end of the designated touchdown zone (TDZ).
Concerned about the deep landing and possible runway overrun, the commander took control, called for a balked landing, and applied full take-off/go-around (TOGA) thrust to initiate a go-around.
However, unbeknownst to the commander, the co-pilot had already deployed the thrust reversers, consistent with normal landing actions when touchdown occurs.
Per Airbus flight crew guidance, a go-around must not be attempted after reverse thrust has been selected. The reversers being deployed meant that engine logic entered reverse mode, and any attempt to switch back to TOGA could cause conflicting commands or delay thrust response.
During the next few seconds, the commander experienced startle, confusion, and hesitation, cycling the thrust levers between TOGA and REV MAX, before finally settling on full reverse thrust and manual braking.
Both pilots, recognising the lack of acceleration and the risks of continuing the go-around, independently and nearly simultaneously called to stop. The aircraft came to a full halt approximately 340 metres before the end of the runway, avoiding a runway excursion.
Crew & Communication
The breakdown in cockpit coordination arose from differing mental models of the landing phase. The co-pilot, focused on touchdown, transitioned into a landing roll mindset and deployed thrust reversers as soon as mainwheel touchdown occurred. Meanwhile, the commander, responding to the perceived deep landing, opted to abandon the landing altogether.
Key human factors identified:
• Startle Effect: The commander was surprised by the reverser activation mid-go-around attempt, leading to delayed decision-making.
• Confirmation Bias: Both pilots interpreted the situation based on their initial expectations, causing confusion when actions did not align.
• Task Saturation: High workload during landing phase, combined with fast-changing conditions, contributed to hesitation and delayed corrective action.
The FCTM explicitly prohibits go-around once reverse thrust is selected due to mechanical and procedural conflicts. However, in this case, the reversers were selected just milliseconds before the go-around attempt began, creating a grey zone of reaction time and procedural ambiguity.
Aircraft Systems & Technical Analysis
The Airbus A320’s thrust lever logic does not support seamless transitions from reverse to TOGA during ground roll. Once the reversers are deployed and the engine enters reverse mode, any attempt to apply forward thrust must:
• Cancel reverse mode
• Reconfigure engine thrust paths
• Allow spool-up from low RPM
This transition introduces significant delays in thrust delivery, which could result in failed or delayed go-around performance—especially on short runways such as Corfu’s 2,373-metre Runway 34.
The rapid cycling of thrust lever positions observed during FDR analysis suggests a period of indecision and reaction to system feedback, including:
• TOGA selected but no acceleration
• Reversers redeployed
• Manual braking applied
Despite these variations, the aircraft systems responded within expected design tolerances, and the reversers re-engaged successfully without mechanical failure.
Passenger Experience & Cabin Conditions
The landing was firm but not outside operational tolerances. Some passengers may have noticed the inconsistent engine sounds during the power transitions, but no injuries were reported, and the aircraft remained fully controllable.
Cabin crew maintained calm and secured the cabin until the aircraft came to a halt. The aircraft did not require emergency services, and passengers disembarked normally at the terminal.
Emergency Response & Aftermath
No emergency was declared as the aircraft came to a controlled stop on the runway with sufficient distance remaining. Airport operations briefly halted while the aircraft vacated the runway, and the crew completed post-flight documentation as per airline procedure.
EasyJet reported the incident and initiated internal crew debriefs. The Hellenic State Investigation Authority delegated the investigation to the UK AAIB, given the aircraft’s operator and registration.
Investigation Status
The AAIB’s final report, issued on 10 April 2025, confirmed this as a serious incident due to the operational conflict between the go-around attempt and the reverser deployment.
The investigation focused on:
• Cockpit communication and CRM effectiveness
• Decision-making under pressure
• Understanding and application of Airbus FCTM guidance
• Potential for simulator training updates
Root Cause & Contributing Factors
Probable Root Cause:
Initiation of a go-around after the thrust reversers had been deployed, in contradiction to Airbus operational guidance.
Contributing Factors:
• Differing perceptions between captain and co-pilot regarding touchdown viability
• Startle and surprise following unexpected reverser activation during go-around
• Delay and indecision during the go-around-rejection decision window
• Lack of clear standard operating procedure for reverser timing in borderline go-around scenarios
Safety Recommendations & Industry Impact
The incident has triggered internal and regulatory reviews, with the following potential outcomes:
• Refinement of Airbus guidance on late-phase go-arounds and reverser logic
• CRM reinforcement in simulator training for transition scenarios involving reverser activation and go-around confusion
• Increased emphasis on runway awareness during the flare and rollout phases
• Post-landing debriefing tools for immediate situational reflection and knowledge capture
Airbus and EasyJet are expected to incorporate lessons from this event into updated training modules.
Conclusion
This incident underscores the critical importance of shared mental models, precise timing, and adherence to manufacturer procedures during high-stakes phases like landing and go-around. The crew’s eventual decision to reject the go-around and commit to a full stop likely averted a runway excursion or worse. It highlights how even routine operations can rapidly become complex when communication and perception diverge under pressure.
Disclaimer
This article is based on publicly available information and reports at the time of writing. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, we cannot guarantee the completeness of the information provided.
If you are the rightful owner of any referenced content or images and wish them to be removed, please contact takedown@cockpitking.com.
