Flight Details
Aircraft Type: Airbus A320-251N
Operator: Air India
Registration: VT-EXT
Flight Number: AI-2592
Route: Goa Manohar International Airport (GOX) to Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Hyderabad (HYD), India
Date of Incident: 5 December 2024
Total Occupants: Not publicly specified (A320 typical capacity around 180 passengers)
Weather Conditions: Night conditions, visibility reported at 3000 metres
Introduction
On 5 December 2024, Air India flight AI-2592, an Airbus A320neo registered VT-EXT, experienced a serious runway incursion incident at Goa Manohar International Airport, India. While taxiing for an intersection departure from runway 28, the aircraft mistakenly aligned with and initiated takeoff from taxiway A rather than the intended runway. The error was identified by Air Traffic Control (ATC) as the aircraft was accelerating through approximately 108 knots groundspeed. ATC instructed an immediate rejection of the takeoff, which the flight crew executed successfully at approximately 124 knots indicated airspeed.
The event, categorised as a serious incident by India’s Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) and the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB), triggered a comprehensive investigation, revealing multiple human factors, procedural, and infrastructural shortcomings.
Sequence of Events
The incident occurred during night-time operations, under reasonable weather conditions with visibility of around 3000 metres. Airport lighting and signage were reportedly operating normally, and no operational delays were recorded for AI-2592’s scheduled departure.
According to investigative findings, the sequence proceeded as follows:
The aircraft was cleared for taxi for an intersection departure from runway 28 via taxiway E and A5. Upon approaching taxiway A5, instead of making the required entry onto A5 towards runway 28, the crew inadvertently continued onto taxiway A. Mistaking the taxiway for the runway, the crew initiated the takeoff roll along taxiway A. ATC, observing the deviation, issued an immediate cancellation of the takeoff clearance and instructed the crew to abort the departure. The flight crew rejected the takeoff at a groundspeed of approximately 108 knots, corresponding to an indicated airspeed of 124 knots. Following the rejected takeoff, the aircraft slowed to taxi speed, turned onto runway 10 via taxiway A2, and vacated the runway at taxiway A4. The aircraft returned to the apron. The flight was subsequently cancelled, and no injuries or aircraft damage were reported.
Crew & Communication
Crew resource management (CRM) during the critical moments was generally effective, with prompt compliance with ATC instructions. However, prior to the incident:
The Pilot-in-Command (PIC) was designated as the Pilot Flying (PF). The First Officer (FO) served as the Pilot Monitoring (PM). The PM was reportedly distracted with Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) issues during the taxi phase, attempting to log back into the system to initiate lineup checklists. This distraction significantly degraded situational awareness in the cockpit at a critical phase, impairing verification of correct taxiway and runway alignment. Despite the distraction, communication within the cockpit remained free of miscommunication or contention.
Notably, there were no readback errors with ATC, and no breakdowns in cockpit communications were observed based on Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) data. However, procedural adherence regarding visual runway verification was not observed.
Aircraft Systems & Technical Analysis
The Airbus A320neo is equipped with standard taxi guidance aids, including navigation display overlays capable of showing the aircraft’s position relative to taxiways and runways. There is no indication that these systems were used effectively during the incident.
Critical systemic findings include:
No failure or malfunction of onboard navigational aids. Normal operation of airport surface signage and lighting systems. The airport lacked an Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS), which might have provided additional surveillance support to ATC to alert earlier to the misalignment.
Flight Data Recorder (FDR) analysis indicated:
Taxi groundspeeds remained under 15 knots during taxiing phases. Takeoff power application coincided with the aircraft positioned along taxiway A. Acceleration was consistent with a normal takeoff roll until the point of rejection.
The rejection itself, initiated at approximately 124 knots IAS, fell within certified rejected takeoff performance margins for the A320neo, indicating good decision-making and execution under the circumstances once the error was identified.
Passenger Experience & Cabin Conditions
The rapid acceleration followed by a sudden deceleration would have been noticeable to passengers, but no injuries were reported.
No abnormal cabin incidents (such as passenger injuries or cabin crew injuries) were reported during the reject sequence. The emergency rejection was performed without deploying thrust reversers at maximum levels, minimising passenger discomfort. Cabin crew would have secured the cabin during taxi and initial departure phases per standard procedure, mitigating injury risks during deceleration.
Following the aborted departure, passengers were deplaned normally after the aircraft returned to the apron.
Emergency Response & Aftermath
Airport emergency services were alerted, as per standard protocols for a rejected takeoff at high speed, but their intervention was not required. No aircraft damage, runway incursions with other vehicles or aircraft, or injuries necessitated active emergency operations.
The aircraft returned to service the following morning after standard technical checks, confirming no structural impacts or system faults arising from the rejected takeoff.
The flight AI-2592 itself was cancelled, and passengers were rebooked on alternative flights.
Investigation Status
India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) and DGCA jointly investigated the incident, releasing a final report on 28 April 2025.
The investigation found the primary causes to be:
Situational Awareness Deficit: The issuance of takeoff clearance by ATC shifted the crew’s cognitive focus towards executing the takeoff, leading to expectation bias and cognitive overload, preventing the identification that they were on a taxiway rather than a runway. Procedural Non-Compliance: The flight crew did not adhere fully to taxi instructions by failing to enter taxiway A5, and subsequently lined up incorrectly onto taxiway A. Distraction of Pilot Monitoring (PM): The PM was distracted by EFB login issues during the critical taxi phase, missing the opportunity to cross-check runway alignment.
Contributing Factors identified included:
Lack of A-SMGCS at Goa Manohar International Airport. Night operations under moderate visibility, increasing reliance on cockpit procedures rather than external visual references. The absence of head-up visual confirmation by the Pilot Flying prior to takeoff initiation.
Data from CVR and FDR confirmed no cockpit stress, urgency, or communication failure, and highlighted that both pilots had considerable flight experience, particularly the Captain with over 23,000 total flight hours.
Root Cause & Contributing Factors
Primary Cause:
Initiation of takeoff roll from an incorrect taxiway due to misidentification of taxiway A as runway 28, combined with inadequate situational awareness and expectation bias following ATC’s takeoff clearance.
Contributing Factors:
Distraction of the PM with secondary tasks (EFB login procedures) during critical alignment verification phases. Absence of automated surface surveillance systems (such as A-SMGCS) that could have alerted ATC earlier. Nighttime environmental conditions increasing difficulty of visual terrain differentiation between taxiways and runways. Lack of full visual cross-checking procedures by the PIC before initiating the takeoff roll.
Safety Recommendations & Industry Impact
The AAIB’s findings prompted several recommendations:
Reinforcement of taxiway and runway verification procedures for all flight crews, particularly at unfamiliar or complex airports. Mandatory cockpit callouts confirming final runway verification before thrust application for takeoff. Enhanced ATC procedures requiring visual confirmation or verbal confirmation from pilots before issuing final takeoff clearance, especially for intersection departures. Accelerated implementation of A-SMGCS or similar surveillance systems at growing secondary airports such as Goa Manohar to assist in nighttime operations.
Additionally, airlines were urged to conduct awareness training focusing on expectation bias and cognitive tunnelling risks following critical ATC clearances during low workload taxi phases.
Conclusion
The incident involving Air India’s Airbus A320neo at Goa Manohar Airport serves as a critical reminder of the complex interaction between human factors, procedural adherence, and situational awareness in the modern cockpit environment. The crew’s immediate compliance with ATC instructions to abort the takeoff prevented potential catastrophe, but the error chain highlights vulnerabilities that must be addressed through reinforced procedural rigour and infrastructure investment.
The aviation industry must continue its focus on reducing reliance on expectation bias and ensuring that even basic visual confirmations are not neglected during routine but critical phases of flight.
Disclaimer
This article is based on publicly available information and reports at the time of writing. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, we cannot guarantee the completeness of the information provided.
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