Flight DE-2314 | Registration: D-ANRA
Date: 2 March 2023 | Location: Enroute over the Indian Ocean, South of Seychelles
Flight Details
• Aircraft Type: Airbus A330-941 (A330-900neo)
• Engines: 2 × Rolls-Royce Trent 7000-72
• Operator: Condor Flugdienst GmbH
• Registration: D-ANRA
• Flight Number: DE-2314
• Callsign: CFG2314
• Route: Frankfurt/Main Airport (EDDF), Germany to Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam International Airport, Mauritius (FIMP)
• Date of Accident: 2 March 2023
• Total Occupants: 290 (277 passengers, 13 crew)
• Weather Conditions: Unforecasted cumulonimbus cloud activity reaching FL460
Introduction
On 2 March 2023, a Condor Airbus A330-900neo operating flight DE-2314 from Frankfurt to Mauritius encountered severe turbulence while cruising at FL390 over the Indian Ocean, approximately two hours before landing. The turbulence resulted in injuries to 22 occupants, including serious injuries to six passengers. The aircraft sustained minor cabin damage but landed safely at Mauritius. Germany’s Bundesstelle für Flugunfalluntersuchung (BFU) conducted a full investigation, concluding a combination of late weather deviation, limitations in radar depiction, and procedural communication lapses contributed to the accident.
Sequence of Events
The flight departed Frankfurt on 1 March 2023 and proceeded uneventfully until cruising over the western Indian Ocean at FL390 along airway UM665. The aircraft was operating with a 1 NM lateral offset to the right between waypoints UVESO and ANKOR. A similar aircraft was on the same route, 2,000 feet above.
The crew was monitoring weather using both the onboard radar (set to All WX mode) and an electronic flight bag (EFB) application, neither of which showed significant convective activity. However, according to SIGWX charts, cumulonimbus activity was present in the area, with vertical development reaching FL460.
Approximately 20 NM before a visible cloud formation on the Navigation Display (ND), the crew requested a course deviation via CPDLC. Without waiting for clearance, they began a right turn to avoid the observed weather. The crew entered a visible cloud bank during the turn, with reflections from strobes visible on the cloud surface and ice crystals forming on the windshield, indicating upper-level moisture and vertical development.
At 00:20Z, the aircraft encountered light turbulence, prompting the crew to switch on the fasten seatbelt signs. No public address (PA) was made, and cabin lights remained dimmed as passengers were sleeping. Cabin service had been suspended.
Within seconds, the turbulence intensified dramatically. The autopilot disconnected automatically as the aircraft experienced severe vertical accelerations ranging between +1.6G and -0.6G over a 10-second period. Passengers and unsecured items were lifted off the floor, and several occupants impacted the overhead Passenger Service Units (PSUs), causing injuries and minor cabin damage.
Crew & Communication
At the time of the accident, the senior first officer was seated in the left-hand seat and was the pilot flying (PF), while the first officer was in the right-hand seat as pilot monitoring (PM). The captain was not in the flight deck, as the flight was being operated during the cruise phase under augmented crew rest scheduling.
Cockpit coordination was maintained, but no PA was made to inform passengers once turbulence was first detected. The crew’s request to deviate from course was sent via CPDLC, but deviation commenced before receiving ATC clearance.
Cockpit voice recordings and flight crew statements revealed that the All WX mode was selected on the radar, which displayed cloud mass in green, without any turbulence return. The ND did not indicate severe activity, which influenced the crew’s decision to delay deviation until visual cues were apparent.
Cabin crew were not warned prior to the onset of turbulence and were unable to secure loose items or ensure passengers were properly seated and belted before the most severe motions began.
Aircraft Systems & Technical Analysis
The Airbus A330-900neo is equipped with a Honeywell RDR-4000 weather radar system with predictive windshear and turbulence detection capabilities. In All WX mode, the radar prioritises precipitation and weather returns but may under-represent turbulence, particularly when embedded in cloud masses with no strong water content signal.
During the incident:
• The radar showed a green return for the cloud mass, indicating low to moderate reflectivity
• No turbulence alert was generated
• Ice accretion and visual cues (strobes in clouds) indicated the aircraft had entered an active convective region
• The autopilot disengaged automatically due to turbulence-induced attitude or flight envelope variations
• Cabin accelerometers recorded significant vertical acceleration deviations, resulting in unrestrained movement of passengers and objects
Damage sustained included overhead PSUs, loose galley equipment, and seat structures affected by passenger impacts.
Passenger Experience & Cabin Conditions
Passengers were mostly asleep in a dimly lit cabin when the turbulence began. The absence of an audible PA meant that many occupants were unaware of the fasten seatbelt sign activation. As a result, several were not belted when the aircraft encountered severe vertical motion.
Within 10 seconds, multiple passengers were thrown upward into the ceiling, striking PSUs and causing injury. Cabin crew were also affected, with one sustaining minor injuries.
According to the BFU’s final report:
• 6 passengers sustained serious injuries
• 15 passengers and 1 cabin crew suffered minor injuries
• Loose galley equipment and unsecured cabin items contributed to secondary impact risks
Emergency Response & Aftermath
The flight continued to Mauritius, where it landed safely on runway 14. Medical personnel were dispatched to meet the aircraft, and injured passengers received treatment. The aircraft was grounded for post-flight inspection and damage assessment, remaining on the ground for more than 14 hours.
Condor confirmed the event, stating that turbulence occurred enroute and that several passengers and one crew member were injured. The airline cooperated with BFU throughout the investigation.
Investigation Status
The German BFU led the investigation, releasing preliminary findings in March 2023 and a final report on 4 April 2025.
Final findings included:
• Probable cause: Entry into an unforecasted but actively growing convective cloud bank that generated severe turbulence.
• Immediate cause: Deviation from course was initiated too late to avoid the upper cloud layer.
• Aggravating factor: A significant number of passengers were not wearing seatbelts at the time of the turbulence.
• Contributory factors:
• Weather radar in All WX mode failed to detect turbulence ahead
• Dynamic development of the cloud made visual detection too late
• Inadequate initial safety and emergency procedures (SEP) training regarding crew communication and system management
Root Cause & Contributing Factors
Root Causes:
• Crew entered an actively developing convective cloud bank due to delayed deviation
• Failure to recognise severity of weather conditions despite visual and limited radar indications
• Passengers not being restrained led to injury upon rapid vertical acceleration changes
Contributing Factors:
• Weather radar limitations in turbulence depiction during cruise
• Lack of real-time pilot reports (PIREPs) in the area
• Incomplete use of available communication channels to issue warnings to cabin crew and passengers
• Gaps in SEP training related to turbulence handling and onboard communication
Safety Recommendations & Industry Impact
The BFU’s investigation recommended:
• Enhanced crew training on weather radar interpretation and limitations
• Reinforcement of seatbelt policies and mandatory announcements when seatbelt signs are illuminated
• Improvements in cabin crew communication protocols during turbulence events
• Use of predictive turbulence modelling and enhanced onboard weather tools
• Manufacturer consideration of radar mode settings that better highlight upper-level convective activity
These recommendations are expected to influence long-haul operational policies, especially on tropical and transoceanic routes prone to embedded convective activity.
Conclusion
The turbulence encounter on Condor flight DE-2314 underscores the danger of embedded weather phenomena and the limitations of current detection systems at cruise altitude. Despite a visually calm radar return, the aircraft entered a convective zone with vertical wind shear strong enough to cause automatic autopilot disconnection and physical injury to multiple occupants.
The incident serves as a critical reminder for proactive deviation planning, consistent passenger briefings, and the continuous improvement of onboard weather technology and communication procedures.
Disclaimer
This article is based on publicly available information and reports at the time of writing. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, we cannot guarantee the completeness of the information provided.
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