Overview
• Operator: Iraqi Airways
• Aircraft Model: Boeing 737-800
• Registration: YI-ASI
• Flight Number: IA-113
• Route: Najaf (Iraq) to Tehran Imam Khomeini (Iran)
• Date: 1 May 2024
• Occupants: Not specified
• Casualties: None reported
• Nature of Incident: Landed on a closed runway (Runway 11L) instead of assigned Runway 11R
Incident Summary
An Iraqi Airways Boeing 737-800, operating as flight IA-113 from Najaf (Iraq) to Tehran Imam Khomeini (Iran), was cleared to land on Runway 11R but mistakenly touched down on the closed Runway 11L at 16:40 local time (13:10 UTC).
The aircraft rolled out without incident, coming to a brief stop approximately 1,920 meters (6,300 feet) down the closed runway before turning around by 135 degrees and vacating via the high-speed turnoff for Runway 29R.
At the time of landing, Runway 11L/29R was NOTAMed closed due to construction work, with workers present on the runway shoulders.
There were no injuries or damage to the aircraft, but Iran’s AAIB launched an investigation due to the severity of the runway incursion.
On February 27, 2025, the Iranian AAIB released its final report, concluding that:
• The crew failed to properly review NOTAMs, ATIS, and tower instructions, focusing primarily on altitude loss instead of runway assignment.
• The pilot initially read back the correct landing clearance for Runway 11R but mistakenly repeated “11L” immediately after, which went unnoticed by the air traffic controller.
• Repeated closures and openings of Runway 11L/29R during construction contributed to cockpit confusion.
Sequence of Events
Pre-incident Conditions:
• The flight was initially cleared by Tehran Approach for descent to FL120, following standard arrival procedure SAV 2R.
• The controller did not specify which runway was in use at this stage.
• At 12:59 UTC, IA-113 was cleared further to 8,000 feet.
Approach & Miscommunication:
• At 13:06 UTC, another arriving flight (IRA718) was cleared to land on Runway 11R.
• At 13:08 UTC, IRA718 landed on Runway 11R, clearing it for the next arrival.
• At 13:09 UTC, IA-113 was cleared to land on Runway 11R with a wind report of 120° at 18 knots.
• The pilot initially read back “Runway 11R” correctly, but immediately followed up with an incorrect “Runway 11L” readback, which went unnoticed by the controller.
• The controller was handling multiple arrivals simultaneously and did not catch the pilot’s incorrect second readback.
Landing on the Closed Runway:
• At 13:10:26 UTC, IA-113 landed on the closed Runway 11L instead of 11R.
• The controller immediately informed the crew that they had landed on an unauthorized runway and instructed them to hold position.
• Ensuring that the aircraft had fully stopped, the controller continued managing other arriving flights before instructing IA-113 to taxi to the SALAM parking area.
Investigation & Findings
Final AAIB Report (February 27, 2025):
The probable causes of the serious incident were:
1. Crew inattention to NOTAMs, ATIS, and tower clearance instructions, focusing only on descent altitude instead of runway assignments.
2. Pilot miscommunication during readback, initially confirming “Runway 11R” but immediately repeating “Runway 11L”, which was not corrected by ATC.
Contributing factors included:
• The airline’s dispatch operations failed to brief the pilots on NOTAM updates, leading to a lack of awareness about Runway 11L’s closure.
• Frequent and consecutive runway closures and reopenings at Tehran Imam Khomeini Airport, increasing the risk of confusion among pilots.
• High workload for the air traffic controller, who was managing multiple arrivals in quick succession, leading to a failure to detect and correct the incorrect readback.
Analysis & Safety Recommendations
For Airlines & Flight Crew Training:
• Strict adherence to NOTAM and ATIS briefings before every flight, ensuring pilots are fully aware of any operational changes at their destination airport.
• Enhanced cockpit discipline in readbacks to prevent contradictory runway confirmations, particularly in complex operational environments.
• Crew resource management (CRM) training should emphasize situational awareness and clear communication in high-pressure situations.
For Iraqi Airways Dispatch & Operations:
• Flight dispatchers must ensure crews receive proper NOTAM briefings before departure to avoid critical misunderstandings.
• Introduce mandatory NOTAM acknowledgment procedures, requiring pilots to verbally confirm awareness of all relevant runway closures.
For Air Traffic Control (ATC) & Airport Operations:
• Controllers should be trained to actively monitor pilot readbacks for errors, especially when handling multiple arrivals simultaneously.
• Encourage the use of standard ICAO phraseology, including the word “Correction” when pilots need to amend their readbacks to reduce miscommunication risks.
• Minimize unnecessary runway configuration changes during construction periods to reduce confusion for flight crews.
• Implement enhanced alerting systems for closed runways, such as:
• Runway status lights to indicate closures.
• Electronic NOTAM alerts in cockpit flight management systems (FMS).
Weather Conditions at the Time (METAR Reports for OIIE – Tehran Imam Khomeini Airport)
• Wind: 110-150° at 16-18 knots
• Visibility: 9999 meters
• Sky Conditions: Few clouds at 4,000 feet, scattered clouds at 10,000 feet
• Temperature: 25-27°C
• Altimeter: 1011-1014 hPa
Conclusion
This incident highlights the risks of miscommunication between pilots and ATC, particularly in complex runway environments with ongoing construction. The crew’s fixation on altitude loss caused them to overlook essential landing instructions, while ATC’s failure to detect the incorrect readback resulted in an uncorrected critical error.
Although no injuries or aircraft damage occurred, the potential for disaster was high, especially with construction workers present near the runway.
To prevent similar incidents, enhanced training in NOTAM awareness, ATC readback discipline, and situational awareness is essential. Additionally, airports should limit frequent runway changes during construction projects to reduce cockpit confusion and operational risks.
Disclaimer
“This report is based on available information as of 27 February 2025. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, the completeness of the details cannot be guaranteed. If you are the rightful owner of any referenced materials and wish them removed, please email takedown@cockpitking.com.”
