Flight Details
Aircraft Type: Airbus A330-900 (A330neo) Operator: ITA Airways (Italia Trasporto Aereo) Registration: EI-HJO Flight Number: AZ610 Route: Rome Fiumicino Airport (FCO), Italy to John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York, USA Date of Incident: 24 April 2025 Total Occupants: Not publicly reported; typical A330-900 configuration seats approximately 260 to 300 passengers Weather Conditions: Stable enroute conditions over the North Atlantic and Irish airspace
Introduction
On 24 April 2025, an ITA Airways Airbus A330-900 operating transatlantic flight AZ610 from Rome to New York was forced to abandon its oceanic crossing and return to Rome after experiencing flight control system problems. While enroute at FL300 over the eastern Atlantic, south of Ireland and in contact with Shannon Control, the flight crew identified a flight control abnormality. Although initially not declared an emergency, the situation deteriorated to the point where the crew determined they could not safely proceed into oceanic airspace, prompting a return to Rome.
The aircraft landed safely at Fiumicino Airport approximately 6 hours after departure, and a replacement Airbus A330-200 completed the journey to New York with a delay of about 10 hours.
Sequence of Events
Flight AZ610 departed Rome without delay and established a normal westbound track toward the Atlantic crossing point south of Ireland. At approximately FL300, the crew contacted Shannon ATC and advised:
They had detected anomalous behaviour in the flight control system It was not considered an emergency at that point They were in communication with ITA Airways dispatch and maintenance control They intended to monitor the situation while continuing towards the oceanic entry point
Prior to entering North Atlantic Track (NAT) airspace, where radar surveillance and immediate diversion options are limited, the crew reassessed and decided it was unsafe to proceed. They requested to terminate the oceanic clearance request and return to Rome.
The aircraft conducted a turnback over the Atlantic, coordinated with Shanwick and Eurocontrol sectors, and flew an easterly route back across the UK and mainland Europe for a non-priority landing at Rome.
Landing was conducted without further incident, and the aircraft taxied to the gate under its own power.
Crew & Communication
The crew adhered closely to Airbus and airline procedures for flight control system anomalies, including:
Monitoring secondary flight controls and flight augmentation systems (e.g., ELAC, SEC, FAC) Consulting dispatch and maintenance for additional fault isolation support Applying the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) for system advisories and diagnostic code transmission Informing ATC appropriately without prematurely declaring an emergency, maintaining full operational control
Given the inherent risk of a transatlantic crossing without guaranteed divert options within ETOPS maximum diversion time, the decision to return was fully compliant with long-haul flight planning safety standards.
Aircraft Systems & Technical Analysis
The Airbus A330-900 is fitted with enhanced fly-by-wire (FBW) systems, including:
Dual Elevator and Aileron Computers (ELACs) Spoiler and Elevator Computers (SECs) Flight Augmentation Computers (FACs) Extensive redundancy across hydraulics, actuators, and electrical systems
Flight control issues on FBW aircraft can include:
Degraded flight control laws (e.g., reverting from normal law to alternate or direct law) Faulty sensor inputs (e.g., angle of attack probes, air data modules) Control surface actuator failure or hydraulic circuit anomaly Software inconsistencies between primary and backup flight control computers
The fact that the crew continued initially suggests that the flight controls remained operational but degraded, or that redundancies were compromised, reducing system reliability for an oceanic environment where diversion options are sparse.
Possible scenarios include:
ELAC or SEC degraded mode warnings Loss of redundancy in critical axes (pitch, roll, or yaw) Conflicting input between control surfaces detected by the PRIM system Irregularities with flight control backup systems (e.g., backup hydraulic pumps or RAT deployment thresholds)
After returning to Rome, the aircraft was removed from service pending thorough diagnostics, indicating more extensive system checks were necessary before any further flights.
Passenger Experience & Cabin Conditions
Passengers were likely unaware of the specific technical nature of the issue. Cabin crew would have informed them that the flight was returning to Rome for technical reasons, with no abnormal in-flight sensations such as sudden roll, pitch instability, or turbulence.
The return flight was smooth and controlled, with passengers disembarking normally upon arrival.
ITA Airways provided rebooking and accommodations for delayed passengers, with a replacement Airbus A330-200 EI-EJM dispatched to complete the journey to New York later that day.
Emergency Response & Aftermath
No emergency services were requested on landing, as the situation remained a precautionary operational decision rather than an in-flight emergency.
Upon return to Rome, Lufthansa Technik and Airbus technical support (if required) likely initiated:
Full BITE (Built-in Test Equipment) diagnostics of flight control computers Functional check flights or ground simulations of flight control behaviour Examination of control surface actuators, hydraulic circuits, and flight law fallback logic Detailed review of system logs transmitted during the flight via ACARS or downloaded post-flight
Investigation Status
There is no formal accident or incident investigation underway. However, the airline’s internal Safety and Compliance Department, along with Airbus A330neo programme support, will perform a technical event review.
Any findings impacting the airworthiness or reliability of the A330-900’s flight control architecture may be shared through industry communication channels such as EASA Airworthiness Directives or Airbus Operators Information Telexes (OITs).
Root Cause & Contributing Factors (Preliminary)
Primary Cause:
Degraded or anomalous behaviour detected in primary or secondary flight control systems, raising operational concerns for continued oceanic flight.
Contributing Factors:
Potential sensor, actuator, or software interface issues within the Fly-By-Wire (FBW) system Reduced system redundancy or fallback mode engagement Conservative decision-making by the crew in light of Extended Range Twin-Engine Operations Performance Standards (ETOPS) risk management
Safety Recommendations & Industry Impact
Pending the full technical review, key industry takeaways are expected to include:
Reinforcement of rigorous pre-oceanic checks for FBW system redundancy status Continued enhancement of real-time monitoring via ACARS or other telemetry platforms Emphasis on pre-emptive return protocols when any primary flight control degradation is suspected on long-haul flights Airbus and airlines may issue advisory notes to reinforce crew decision thresholds regarding partial system degradation over ETOPS sectors
Conclusion
ITA Airways flight AZ610’s decision to return to Rome following the detection of flight control system problems represents proactive and prudent safety management. Though no emergency occurred, the complexity of FBW systems on long-haul aircraft demands immediate conservative action when control anomalies arise, especially ahead of oceanic operations where immediate diversion is limited.
The aircraft remains grounded pending detailed inspection, underlining the importance of prevention and operational conservatism in global commercial aviation.
Disclaimer
This article is based on publicly available information and reports at the time of writing. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, we cannot guarantee the completeness of the information provided.
If you are the rightful owner of any referenced content or images and wish them to be removed, please contact takedown@cockpitking.com.
