Flights MB-380 & 7L-625 | Registrations: TC-MCN & VP-BMU
Date: 27 February 2025 | Location: Hong Kong International Airport (VHHH), China
Flight Details
Aircraft 1
• Type: Airbus A330-300 Freighter
• Engines: 2 × Rolls-Royce Trent 772B-60
• Operator: MNG Airlines
• Registration: TC-MCN
• Flight Number: MB-380
• Route: Hong Kong (VHHH) to Istanbul (LTBA)
• Crew: 5
• Departure Runway: 07C
• SID: BEKOL 1Y
Aircraft 2
• Type: Boeing 777-200F
• Engines: 2 × General Electric GE90-110B1
• Operator: Silk Way Airlines
• Registration: VP-BMU
• Flight Number: 7L-625
• Route: Hong Kong (VHHH) to Baku (UBBB)
• Crew: 5
• Departure Runway: 07R
• SID: BEKOL 1X
Weather Conditions: VMC
Total Occupants (Combined): 10 crew
Introduction
On 27 February 2025, two departing widebody freighters at Hong Kong International Airport—an MNG Airlines Airbus A330-300 (TC-MCN) and a Silk Way Airlines Boeing 777-200F (VP-BMU)—experienced a serious loss of separation after taking off from adjacent runways just 13 seconds apart. The aircraft were cleared for take-off under conflicting trajectories governed by converging Standard Instrument Departure (SID) routes. The proximity reached a critical minimum of 100 feet vertically and approximately 0.4 NM (800 metres) horizontally before evasive action was taken.
The incident has been officially classified as a serious loss of separation event involving a TCAS Resolution Advisory and is under active investigation by Hong Kong’s Civil Aviation Department (CAD).
Sequence of Events
At 06:59:09 local time, MNG Airlines flight MB-380 was cleared for take-off from runway 07C via the BEKOL 1Y SID. Thirteen seconds later, at 06:59:22, Silk Way flight 7L-625 was cleared for take-off from runway 07R via the BEKOL 1X SID. Both aircraft were climbing on departure with converging initial flight paths.
At the time of clearance, Hong Kong’s North and South Control Towers were responsible for runways 07C and 07R respectively. According to standard dependent parallel runway operations, a 3-minute separation should have been maintained between such departures due to track convergence. This procedural buffer was not upheld.
As both aircraft climbed through approximately 2,500 feet, ATC recognised the convergence risk and issued amended clearances: MB-380 was instructed to climb to 5,000 feet, and 7L-625 was restricted to 3,000 feet. However, due to differing climb rates, vertical separation was still insufficient.
At 07:01:48, the Air Traffic Management System’s Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) triggered a warning, and seconds later, at 07:02:07, the crew of 7L-625 reported a TCAS Resolution Advisory to descend, which they followed. MB-380 received a Traffic Advisory but continued the instructed climb. Vertical separation was re-established shortly after, reaching 1,000 feet as the aircraft diverged.
Crew & Communication
Both flight crews responded in accordance with standard TCAS protocols. Silk Way’s B777 immediately executed the descent directive issued by the onboard ACAS (TCAS) system. MNG’s A330 crew, receiving only a Traffic Advisory, continued their assigned climb per ATC instructions.
There were no communication breakdowns between the aircraft and ATC during the event. However, coordination between the two control towers—North (AMM) and South (AMS)—was found to be reactive rather than preventative, with remedial coordination occurring only after both aircraft were airborne.
The crews maintained visual contact throughout the event and acknowledged each other’s presence during ATC traffic advisories.
Aircraft Systems & Technical Analysis
Both aircraft were equipped with modern TCAS II systems compliant with ICAO ACAS standards. The systems successfully identified the loss of separation and issued advisories that were followed promptly.
The aircraft were operating on converging SID routes:
• BEKOL 1Y (A330) and BEKOL 1X (B777) share similar departure paths with slight route divergence occurring only at higher altitudes.
• With simultaneous clearance, the climb performance of the two aircraft (typically higher for a lightly loaded freighter like the B777) contributed to closing vertical separation.
ADS-B analysis confirmed:
• Horizontal distance reduced to 0.4 NM
• Vertical separation narrowed to just 100 feet
• Conflict occurred at 07:02:06Z
• Safe separation re-established by 07:02:37Z
No flight path deviation outside of TCAS-initiated manoeuvring was recorded. No damage, turbulence interaction, or crew incapacitation occurred.
Passenger Experience & Cabin Conditions
As both flights were freighter operations, no passengers were on board. The event was entirely managed by the flight crews and air traffic controllers, with no broader cabin or commercial implications.
Emergency Response & Aftermath
No emergency declaration was made. Both aircraft continued uneventfully to their destinations—Baku and Istanbul respectively. No diversions or returns were required.
Hong Kong Airport operations were not affected, though internal procedural reviews were launched immediately by the CAD. Both airlines confirmed that standard post-flight reports were submitted and that crew actions were aligned with international safety protocols.
Investigation Status
Hong Kong’s Civil Aviation Department (CAD) launched a formal investigation within 24 hours. Preliminary findings were released on 6 April 2025, detailing:
• Take-off clearance was given 13 seconds apart instead of the required 3-minute buffer
• Dependent departure procedures were not upheld
• Lack of predictive coordination between North and South Tower operations
• TCAS and STCA systems performed correctly
• Human factors and controller workload may have influenced decision-making
Further investigation will examine:
• Tower procedures for dependent runway operations
• ATC training and tower coordination SOPs
• Automation and surveillance data usage in separation management
Full flight data and voice communication logs have been secured for analysis.
Root Cause & Contributing Factors
Root Cause:
Failure to apply required 3-minute temporal separation between dependent runway departures with converging SID routes.
Contributing Factors:
• Dual tower control operation with insufficient coordination
• Assumption that differing SID assignments would result in safe divergence
• Unexpected rate of climb variance between the aircraft
• Overreliance on procedural clearance rather than real-time trajectory prediction
• Delayed conflict recognition and reactive ATC intervention
Safety Recommendations & Industry Impact
This serious incident underlines the critical importance of:
• Strict adherence to dependent parallel runway separation procedures
• Enhanced coordination protocols between physically separated control towers
• Implementation of predictive conflict detection tools for simultaneous departures
• Reviewing SID route design for convergence and climb rate risks
CAD may issue updated guidelines for Hong Kong International ATC operations, and ICAO may recommend updated phraseology and procedures where tower control is split between multiple units on a single airfield.
Airlines operating from Hong Kong may also be advised to brief crews on the risks associated with simultaneous SID convergence and to review TCAS event training protocols.
Conclusion
The near-miss involving two widebody freighters at one of Asia’s busiest international hubs underscores the fragility of procedural safeguards when multiple control units operate in parallel. Fortunately, robust airborne safety systems, professional flight crew responses, and timely ATC action prevented a mid-air collision.
This event serves as a crucial reminder of the need for unwavering procedural discipline, enhanced ATC coordination, and modern technological support in complex airspace environments.
Disclaimer
This article is based on publicly available information and reports at the time of writing. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, we cannot guarantee the completeness of the information provided.
If you are the rightful owner of any referenced content or images and wish them to be removed, please contact takedown@cockpitking.com.
