On 3 December 2024, a Qantas Airbus A330-200 en route from Los Angeles to Brisbane was forced to return to its departure airport following the in-flight observation of sparks emanating from the right-hand engine. The aircraft, registered VH-EBQ, operating flight QF16, safely landed at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) after approximately 5 hours and 50 minutes airborne. Post-flight inspections revealed internal engine damage consistent with a high-pressure compressor (HPC) malfunction, prompting a formal investigation by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB).
This article reconstructs the timeline and technical implications of the incident using official ATSB findings and publicly available data. All facts presented are in line with formal preliminary disclosures and regulatory reporting standards.
Flight Details
Operator: Qantas Airways Limited Flight Number: QF16 Aircraft Type: Airbus A330-202 Registration: VH-EBQ Engines: 2 × General Electric CF6-80E1A4 Date of Incident: 3 December 2024 Origin: Los Angeles International Airport (KLAX) Destination: Brisbane Airport (YBBN) Persons on Board: 149 passengers, 9 crew Flight Level at Time of Diversion: FL320 Declared Emergency: PAN-PAN Diversion Airport: Los Angeles (KLAX) Landing Runway: 24R
Preceding Events: Engine Advisory on Prior Flight
The aircraft had previously operated the inbound leg from Brisbane to Los Angeles. During that flight, on 4 December 2024 (UTC), the flight crew received an advisory indicating high N2 vibration on the right engine shortly after the top of descent.
In response:
The engine was operated at idle thrust for the remainder of the flight. Upon arrival in Los Angeles, visual inspection of the exhaust revealed metallic particles, though no internal inspection was conducted at that time. In consultation with the Qantas Maintenance Operations Centre, the vibration sensor was deferred under the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) and was marked inoperative. The aircraft was released to service with the N2 vibration readings unavailable for the outbound flight.
It is important to note that the flight crew operating the return flight were briefed on the N2 sensor issue, but were not informed about the observed particles in the exhaust.
The Incident Flight: QF16 from LAX to BNE
Departure and Early Cruise
QF16 departed LAX at 0458 UTC on 3 December 2024. The aircraft climbed without abnormal indications and levelled at FL320, later cleared to climb to FL340.
Flight crew at this time comprised:
Captain First Officer Second Officer A (on rest) Second Officer B (active on deck)
The captain and Second Officer B remained on the flight deck, with the captain manually recording engine performance data as a precautionary step due to the previously logged engine vibration advisory.
Passenger Observation and Visual Confirmation
At cruise, a passenger seated on the right side of the aircraft observed visible sparks from the right engine and notified cabin crew. Second Officer B was dispatched to verify the report:
Observed intermittent sparks from the engine nacelle. Reviewed video footage recorded by the passenger. Returned to the cockpit to brief the captain.
Based on the new information and prior maintenance history, the captain and Second Officer B jointly assessed that continuing to Brisbane was not advisable.
Flight Crew Coordination and Diversion Initiation
Resting crew were recalled to the cockpit. The equal time point (ETP) between Los Angeles and Honolulu had not yet been passed. Multiple airports were considered; Los Angeles was selected due to: Familiarity Weather and NOTAMs Availability of emergency services GE engine support infrastructure Cabin crew began rotating rest seats to visually monitor the engine.
At 0732 UTC, the flight crew declared PAN-PAN and advised ATC of a planned diversion to Los Angeles via CPDLC (Controller–Pilot Data Link Communications).
The crew requested a step descent to FL310 to reduce thermal and mechanical load on the engine. At this time, sparks ceased, and engine parameters remained nominal apart from slightly elevated fuel flow and EGT.
Approach and Compressor Stall
Following stabilised cruise and planning, the captain took rest, returning to the flight deck at 0942 UTC in preparation for descent.
At approximately 1027 UTC, while descending through 7,000 feet, the crew reported:
Hearing three loud bangs A compressor stall was detected on the right engine Engine parameters shifted; thrust was immediately reduced to idle The engine stall checklist was initiated (QRH procedure)
The thrust lever was left at idle to avoid aggravating the compressor condition.
ATC was notified, the approach was cancelled, and vectors were provided for repositioning. Firefighting services were requested in preparation for landing.
At 1039 UTC, the aircraft re-entered the approach path, landing uneventfully on runway 24R. The aircraft came to a stop on a taxiway to allow engine inspection by ARFF units.
Post-Landing Inspection and Maintenance Response
Visual inspection by airport emergency teams found no visible fire, smoke, or fluid leaks. The aircraft taxied to the gate under its own power. Passengers disembarked normally.
The aircraft was withdrawn from service pending detailed engine analysis.
Preliminary Maintenance Findings:
Post-flight borescopic inspection of the right-hand General Electric CF6-80E1A4 engine revealed:
Metallic debris in the engine exhaust One missing high-pressure compressor blade, fractured at the blade root One fractured blade, broken mid-span Tip damage on several other HPC blades A misaligned Stage 4 variable stator vane (VSV) set 90° off-axis A fractured VSV lever arm, responsible for stator angle misalignment
This configuration supports a failure scenario involving mechanical imbalance, probable blade liberation, and a consequential compressor stall due to aerodynamic disruption.
The engine was removed and sent to a GE Aerospace technical facility for teardown and root cause analysis.
ATSB Investigation
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has classified the occurrence as an incident and launched an active investigation. Their preliminary report outlines both:
Event timeline, including engine performance history and spark detection Crew decisions, diversion criteria, and compliance with operational procedures Inspection findings, identifying the physical source of failure
No conclusions have been drawn regarding root cause at this stage. The investigation is ongoing and will include:
Laboratory analysis of the liberated HPC blade(s) Material and fatigue testing Examination of the VSV actuation system Review of maintenance records, MEL decisions, and engineering consultations Evaluation of communications between maintenance and flight crew
Aircraft Technical Information
Aircraft Model: Airbus A330-202 MSN: [Not Publicly Disclosed] Registration: VH-EBQ Engines: 2 × CF6-80E1A4 Age: Approx. 14 years Seating Configuration: Long-haul economy/premium economy Certifications: ETOPS-180 Maintenance Provider: Qantas Engineering, in coordination with GE
Conclusion
The Qantas A330-200 engine incident over the Pacific on 3 December 2024 highlights the importance of:
Flight crew vigilance and prompt decision-making Effective coordination between aircrew, ATC, and engineering support Pre-cautionary return protocol even in the absence of hard-limit exceedances The risks associated with deferred defect items, particularly where underlying physical symptoms may not be fully observable during initial ground assessment
The aircraft’s safe return, successful overweight landing, and calm handling of a mid-oceanic engine disturbance reflect adherence to established safety protocols and Airbus QRH guidance.
Pending full engine teardown and forensic review, the root cause remains under investigation.
Disclaimer
This article is based on publicly available information and official reports at the time of writing. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, we cannot guarantee the completeness of the information provided.
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