A Boeing 737-300 operated by Iran-based Varesh Airlines overran the runway at Dushanbe International Airport (UTDD), Tajikistan, during a landing attempt in adverse weather on 10 April 2025. The aircraft, registration EP-VAI, was conducting flight VRH6805 from Tehran Imam Khomeini International Airport (OIIE) with 106 passengers and 10 crew members on board. The aircraft came to rest beyond the Runway End Safety Area (RESA) with all landing gear on soft, muddy terrain. Minor aircraft damage occurred, but there were no injuries.
The incident has been classified as a serious incident by the Iranian Aircraft Accident Investigation Board (AAIB), which was delegated responsibility for investigation by the Tajik authorities.
Flight Details and Background
Operator: Varesh Airlines Flight Number: VRH6805 Date: 10 April 2025 Aircraft Type: Boeing 737-300 Registration: EP-VAI Departure Airport: Tehran Imam Khomeini (OIIE) Arrival Airport: Dushanbe International (UTDD) Occupants: 116 (106 passengers + 10 crew) Runway Used: 09 Runway Length: Approx. 3,000 metres (9,843 feet) Landing Time: 06:08 UTC Weather at Time of Landing: Thunderstorm, heavy precipitation, variable winds Outcome: Runway overrun into soft ground; aircraft stopped beyond RESA
Flight Crew Configuration
The Pilot Flying (PF) was the captain seated in the left-hand seat. The Pilot Monitoring (PM), seated in the right-hand seat, was a flight instructor. This role reversal—common during line checks or assessments—places the more experienced pilot in a monitoring position.
Both pilots were reportedly certified and appropriately qualified. The crew was cleared for an ILS approach to runway 09 at 06:05:28 UTC. Weather was already deteriorating at this point, with thunderstorm activity, reduced visibility, and heavy rainfall observed around the field.
Despite updated weather reports—including gusty wind conditions and visual warnings from tower controllers of “unusual weather phenomena”—the crew continued the approach.
Approach Phase and Weather Conditions
Weather data from METARs surrounding the time of the incident indicate the following:
06:00 UTC: Winds variable at 4G9 MPS (~7–17 knots), visibility 1,900 metres, thunderstorm with rain (-TSRA), SCT044, BKN052CB 06:30 UTC: Visibility 6,000 m, continued thunderstorms, BKN049CB 06:08 UTC (landing): Airport reports active CB clouds, thunderstorm proximity, variable wind, rain and poor visibility
The tower controller warned of strong convective weather and gusty winds, yet clearance for landing was issued at 06:08:39 UTC after wind conditions were relayed.
The crew committed to the approach, and no diversion, missed approach, or holding was initiated despite real-time visibility and weather deterioration.
Landing Flare and Runway Excursion
According to the Pilot’s Post-Event Report, visibility during the flare phase deteriorated dramatically. The captain stated:
“During landing flare, the visibility became poor as the runway edge lights were difficult to see due to heavy precipitation.”
This visual degradation caused the flare to be extended inadvertently, resulting in a late touchdown—a critical error on a wet runway.
The aircraft reportedly touched down well beyond the aiming point markers, reducing available runway length for deceleration. The captain deployed thrust reversers and applied maximum manual braking, but the remaining runway distance was insufficient to stop.
The aircraft exited the paved surface beyond the Runway 09 threshold, overshooting the end of the RESA and coming to rest in a grass-covered, muddy area. The empennage remained on paved surface, but all gear straddled the soft terrain.
Damage Assessment
Post-incident inspection revealed the following:
Burst nose landing gear tire External cowling damage to engine #2 (right-hand engine) Minor damage to right main landing gear strut and air/ground switch Ingress of mud, water, and debris into: Both engine nacelles Landing gear assemblies Cabin air system inlets
There were no structural airframe fractures, and no indication of fire, smoke, or fuel leaks. However, contamination of critical systems may require substantial cleaning, component replacement, and functional testing.
Flight Crew Actions and Technical Considerations
While the crew was aware of deteriorating weather, they elected to proceed with landing rather than execute a go-around. Critical contributing factors to the overrun include:
1. Delayed Touchdown Point
Due to poor visibility during flare Increased stopping distance required Reduced reaction time for braking and reverser deployment
2. Compromised Runway Friction
Heavy rainfall likely resulted in runway contamination Hydroplaning potential elevated Braking action was not reported or assessed before approach
3. Unstabilised Approach Indicators
Continuing descent in low visibility with approaching thunderstorm activity Visual reference lost during flare—a classic case of “visual illusion in weather” Absence of approach ban or operational weather minima decision-making review
Runway Safety Context
Runway 09 at Dushanbe is approximately 3,000 metres long, which under dry conditions is more than adequate for a 737-300 with standard payload. However, when wet, the stopping margin becomes significantly reduced, especially with:
Late touchdown Delayed or partial deceleration Wet or contaminated surface with poor braking action
There is no publicly available record confirming the presence or status of Runway End Safety Area (RESA) arrestor systems (e.g. EMAS), nor whether friction testing (Mu readings) were conducted during the storm period.
Investigation and Delegation
Although the incident occurred in Tajikistan, the Iranian AAIB has been delegated responsibility for the investigation under ICAO Annex 13 provisions, as the aircraft was Iranian-registered.
The AAIB has rated the occurrence a serious incident and initiated a full investigation. Their preliminary findings confirm:
The flight crew was conducting an ILS approach Heavy precipitation and thunderstorm activity were present on final Runway visibility deteriorated severely during flare Overrun resulted from inadequate stopping distance after late touchdown
Regulatory and Operational Implications
Several safety and regulatory concerns arise from this event:
Flight Crew Decision-Making
Whether approach continuation was in line with operator SOPs under rapidly deteriorating weather Evaluation of go-around criteria Flight crew monitoring performance—especially with an instructor PM
Weather Minima and ATC Coordination
Was reported weather below landing minima? Was braking action or runway surface condition NOTAM’d or conveyed? Were TAF or METAR forecasts accurate, or did deterioration exceed prediction?
Airport Infrastructure
Is RESA compliant with ICAO Annex 14 standards? Does UTDD have real-time runway surface condition monitoring? Is FOD/contamination clearance in heavy rainfall regularly assessed?
Aircraft Status and Recovery
The aircraft was removed from soft ground by local airport emergency and ground recovery teams. Initial cleaning and FOD inspection were conducted at the incident site, followed by towing to a remote stand.
As of the last update, EP-VAI remains grounded pending:
Landing gear structural inspection Engine inlet and fan section cleaning/inspection Nose gear tire and strut replacement Brake unit and wheel inspection Cabin air system contamination check
A return-to-service is expected only after full systems testing and CAA verification.
Conclusion
The runway overrun involving Varesh Airlines flight VRH6805 on 10 April 2025 underscores the convergence of adverse weather, crew misjudgement, and late landing dynamics. While the aircraft suffered only minor physical damage and no lives were lost, the incident illustrates the criticality of decision-making in low-visibility storm conditions.
Visual deterioration in the flare, combined with wet runway braking limitations, resulted in an outcome that could have been far more serious had the overrun area been obstructed or the aircraft veered off course.
A full final report from the Iranian AAIB is expected, which may include findings related to human factors, SOP compliance, and airport surface condition management. In the meantime, the event serves as a stark reminder of the importance of go-around discipline, approach stabilisation, and weather assessment thresholds in operational safety.
Disclaimer
This article is based on publicly available information and reports at the time of writing. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, we cannot guarantee the completeness of the information provided.
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